Apatrida:
En el punto 2 tengo una duda que desde hace tiempo trato de aclarar sin resultado, ya que en las fuentes por mi consultadas no aparece ningun combate entre las fuerzas de Pareja y los mambises en esas fechas, es mas creo que las fuerzas de Pareja no intentaron salir a auxiliar a sus compañeros de Santiago. Creo que las fuerzas mambisas en la zona estarian muy debilitadas, ya que la brigada de Ramón de las Yaguas se desplazó hacia Daiquiri, Siboney y despues Santiago. ¿Sabes en que consistió esto de mantener ocupado? ¿Tienes alguna noticia de combate o accion en esa zona?
Claro tengo fuentes al respecto que muestran que hubo combates entre la combinacion marines-cubanos y los españoles.
Esta es de un foro muy conocido sobre la guerra de 1898:
http://www.eldesastredel98.com/capitulos/caribe10.htm
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_ ... A1namo_Bay
The next day, the Marines were reinforced by about 60 Cubans under Lieutenant Colonel Enrique Thomas. The Cubans had been equipped with rifles and white duck sailor uniforms by Commander McCalla from the USS Marblehead.Familiar with guerrilla tactics, the Cuban insurgents deployed in pairs in front of the camp, burning the brush and undergrowth as they advanced, thus denying to the enemy of cover. The USS Marblehead, which had provided shore bombardment on several occasions, steamed down the coast and shelled the well at Cuzco. Nevertheless, the Spanish attack was resumed at dusk, and two more Marines—acting Sergeant Major Henry Good and Private Goode Taurman—were killed.
The Spanish were unable to accurately return fire, allowing Marine Company B and the Cuban rebels to close the distance, firing as they advanced
After the Navy cut the cables and established a base at Guantánamo Bay, General Pareja remained in complete ignorance concerning the course of the war because the Cuban insurgents maintained such a tight ring about the city that not one messenger got through their lines. Fifteen were caught and executed as spies
The threat posed by U.S. Naval forces and a battalion of Marines at Guantánamo Bay, plus the stranglehold on land communications by 1,000 Cuban insurgents, effectively pinned down an army of 7,000 men which might have changed the outcome of the fighting at Santiago.
Como ve los cubanos estaban peleando en Guantanamo y fueron de utilidad,le aconsejaria para un mejor entendimiento de lo que ocurrio en esta zona de Cuba,leer la direccion de la web,que esta arriba,ahi se comenta todo lo que paso en esos combates.
Aqui le mando mas articulos escritos por marines que participaron en la accion:
http://www.spanamwar.com/1stmarinebattalion.html
http://www.spanamwar.com/Guantanamo.htm
El relato de dos periodistas americanos presentes en el momento de los hechos(Crane y Billman).
Both Crane and Billman were impressed with the qualities of the Cubans as fighting men. Crane viewed them as excitable and unpredictable under fire in contrast to the marines, who were well disciplined and efficient. He (Crane) said that they used their rifles as if they were squirt guns and that the function of the lieutenant who commanded them was to "stand back of the line, frenziedly beat his machete through the air, and with incredible rapidity how: 'Fuego!, fuego! fuego! fuego! fuego!'". Crane respected their daring: "They paid no heed whatever to the Spaniards volleys, but simply lashed themselves into a delirium that disdained everything." Billman praised the way the Americans and Cubans cooperated, although saying they would "no more assimilate than Irishmen and Italians." "Cubans are absolutely necessary to the arm as guides," he wrote, and there are not lacking indications that the Spanish soldier has a whole dread of them in the field
http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/guantanamo-bay
On 12 June, some 60 of the Cuban freedom fighters under a Col Laborde paid a visit to Huntington's camp. The Cubans related that the Spanish had some 400 troops stationed at Cuzco Well, a point about 4 miles southeast of the Marines. The Spanish had maintained a regular station there because of the fresh water, and now troops from Fisherman's Point at the mouth of Guantanamo Bay, who had fled Yankee guns a few days earlier, had joined them. The two leaders discussed strategy, with the Cuban recommending an attack on the well. Huntington was reluctant at first because of the lack of possible reinforcements and the knowledge that the Spanish troops under Pareja at Guantanamo City had railroad access to Caimanera should they want to try and reach Cuzco Well quickly. Both McCalla and the Marine leader agreed, however, that if the fresh water supply at the well was shut off, the Spanish would have to abandon lower Guantanamo Bay
Two questions remain. Why did Lineres fail to concentrate his forces? He had ample time between the landing of Shafter in Cuba and the attack on El Caney and San Juan Hill to have shifted forces from Guantanamo Bay to near Santiago. The answer is that he tried to contact Pareja, but the thousands of Cuban insurgents roaming the area between Santiago and Guantanamo intercepted and executed many messengers. Furthermore, Lineres still expected a major U.S. offensive at Guantanamo so he left Pareja there in order not to lose that city and because he erroneously thought that he could hold off the Army at his location since his troop strength was about equal to that of Shafter's. In addition, Lineres believed that he lacked the supplies to support additional troops at Santiago. But his failure to deploy his troops properly cost the Spanish dearly at Las Guasimas, El Caney, and San Juan.
Why did Pareja not send his force to Santiago, or at least a scouting party, since he knew the telegraph and cable lines had been severed and the Americans were ready to attack? For one thing, like Lineres, he sent out scouts who were intercepted by the Cubans. Secondly, his last order from Lineres was to stay put. Pareja doubtless decided this was good advice since he shared his commander's belief that the Americans would still try an invasion of Cuba through Guantanamo. This seemed even more plausible to Pareja after he learned that the Marines had routed his men at Cuzco Well, and he was led to believe that their force was much greater than his own. This last point in fact might have kept Pareja at Guantanamo City even had he learned that Lineres was in trouble. That is, had Pareja received word to send reinforcements to Santiago, he might still have determined his force was best deployed where it was with such a large force of Marines at Guantanamo Bay and with his knowledge that thousands of other Spanish forces were available to Lineres around Santiago. Indeed, had Pareja not believed the Marine force was larger than it was and likely to attack his position, he might have spent more time trying to communicate with Lineres. As it turned out, his decision to remain at Guantanamo City, and conversely the presence of the Marines at Guantanamo Bay, may have cost Spain a victory and an opportunity to prolong the war.
Se puede consultar estos libros:
War and Genocide in Cuba
John Tone
Pioneers of Amphibious Warfare, 1898-1945
Leo J. Daugherty
In the Fist of Earlier Revolutions: Postemancipation Social Control
David C. Carlson
Carlson critica a Tone y dice que la actuacion cubana si matuvo a los españoles encerrados en Guatanamo.
Lo que busco aca con estas fuentes,es que todos puedan acceder a ellas y con esto se sepa un poco mas de lo que paso en Guatanamo,ya que esta area de operaciones de la guerra de 1898,ha sido un poco olvidada.
Puedes encontrarla en parte en Google books.
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( hace años se llamo Plaza del Alferez Provisional).
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